Practical Picks PP-283: earlier hands-on check record, October 3, 2026 Observed 2026-10-03, Linux. No real credentials or remote push. Historical record. This small check ran on October 3, 2026, before Practical Picks adopted its research-only method later that day. It is kept as dated, bounded evidence. It is not current testing, and it did not decide the article's recommendations, which since October 19, 2026 rest on public sources. Practical Picks no longer runs product checks; the replay instructions below describe how this historical record was produced. Correction, October 19, 2026: the host Git reported version 2.43.0. Upstream Git 2.43.0 falls within the affected range of CVE-2025-48384 (fixed upstream in 2.50.1 and later, and in patch releases 2.43.7, 2.44.4, 2.45.4, 2.46.4, 2.47.3, 2.48.2 and 2.49.1). Linux distributions often backport such fixes without changing the version number; for example, Ubuntu 24.04 fixed its Git 2.43.0 package in July 2025 (USN-7626-1). This record did not capture the package build of the host Git, so it does not establish whether that binary was affected. The Python 3 minor version was also not recorded. Note, October 19, 2026: the git-filter-repo v2.47.0 tarball hash below matches the SHA-256 that Homebrew's git-filter-repo formula pins for the official v2.47.0 release download. Question: Can a local tool remove an invented secret file and an invented inline token from all reachable branch/tag history while keeping unrelated work? Environment: Linux, Git 2.43.0, Python 3, Java 21.0.12.1. Separate disposable mirrors. No account, system install, push or actual secret. Combined task-local downloads, extraction, fixtures and output occupied 19 MB after tests. Versions and downloaded SHA-256: git-filter-repo v2.47.0 tar.xz: 4662cbe5918196a9f1b5b3e1211a32e61cff1812419c21df4f47c5439f09e902 extracted git-filter-repo script: 67447413e273fc76809289111748870b6f6072f08b17efe94863a92d810b7d94 BFG v1.15.0 jar: dfe2885adc2916379093f02a80181200536856c9a987bf21c492e452adefef7a These are our download hashes, not vendor signatures. Recreate fixture: download /assets/pp283/make-fixture.py and run `python3 make-fixture.py NEW_EMPTY_DIRECTORY`. The script refuses to overwrite an existing directory. It creates original.git plus a work tree with seven commits, main and feature branches, v1 tag and a two-parent merge. Past commits contain: secrets.txt: PP283_INVENTED_FILE_SECRET_NEVER_VALID src/settings.txt: PP283_INVENTED_INLINE_TOKEN_NEVER_VALID Current main has removed/replaced both. notes.txt, README.md and feature.txt are unrelated controls. All token strings are invented and never valid. Use fresh disposable mirrors, replacing paths below with your task-local paths: git clone --mirror original.git filter.git git clone --mirror original.git bfg.git printf 'literal:PP283_INVENTED_INLINE_TOKEN_NEVER_VALID==>REDACTED\n' > replace-filter.txt printf 'PP283_INVENTED_INLINE_TOKEN_NEVER_VALID==>REDACTED\n' > replace-bfg.txt (cd filter.git && git-filter-repo --force --invert-paths --path secrets.txt --replace-text ../replace-filter.txt) java -jar bfg.jar --delete-files secrets.txt --replace-text replace-bfg.txt bfg.git The test used --force only on an expendable mirror. The BFG command keeps its default HEAD protection. Exact arguments, stdout, stderr and exit codes are in /assets/pp283/preflight-runs.json and /assets/pp283/failure-recovery-runs.json. For every original and rewritten mirror, list refs with `git for-each-ref --format='%(refname)'`; get reachable commits with `git rev-list --all`; enumerate reachable objects with `git rev-list --objects --all` and inspect blob contents with `git cat-file blob`. Check for both invented strings, the secrets.txt path, notes.txt, and number of main-tip parents (`git rev-list --parents -n 1 main`). Clone each mirror into a new directory. Check main README, feature branch file and v1 tag there. Observed assertions (public replay results: /assets/pp283/replay-results.json): original git-filter-repo BFG exit n/a 0 0 reachable commits 7 5 7 main-tip parents 2 2 2 main/feature/v1 refs yes yes yes secret path reachable yes no no file token reachable yes no no inline token reachable yes no no unrelated note reachable yes yes yes fresh clone pass pass pass Five reachable commits under git-filter-repo means it pruned now-empty commits. Neither tool preserved original object IDs. The original bare mirror and its fresh clone remained contaminated. The fresh-clone check confirmed expected refs and current files. A separate reachable-blob scan found one blob per invented string in the original fresh clone and zero in each rewritten clone. Failure/recovery checks on separate copies: 1. Add a local commit to a normal clone. Run git-filter-repo without --force. Exit 1: it refused a non-fresh clone. HEAD SHA was identical before/after. Discard this disposable clone and restart from a fresh mirror. 2. Add both invented strings to the current main tip in another copy, mirror it, and run the same BFG command. BFG exited 0 but warned that protected HEAD held dirty content. `git show main:secrets.txt` and `git show main:src/settings.txt` still returned both strings. A zero exit is insufficient; make the tip clean, use a fresh mirror and verify reachable blobs before sharing. The public replay script checks these exit codes, strings and ref/blob assertions: /assets/pp283/replay.py. To replay locally, download both Python files above and the pinned tool assets from the product release pages below. Run `python3 replay.py ABSOLUTE_FILTER_SCRIPT ABSOLUTE_BFG_JAR` in a disposable directory. The replay creates its own temporary synthetic repository and deletes it after checks. It prints JSON results with original, rewritten and fresh-clone ref/blob counts and both failure assertions. No real repository or credential is an input. We did not run BFG's advised reflog expiry/garbage collection, handle Git LFS or submodules, scan signed tags, test a large repo, force-push, request host cleanup, or touch colleague clones. Local rewriting does not revoke credentials or erase copies elsewhere. If a real credential leaked, revoke/rotate it first. Coordinate a server and other-clone cleanup under the host's current procedure. GitHub documents limits from forks, cached views, pull requests and old clones: https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/keeping-your-account-and-data-secure/removing-sensitive-data-from-a-repository Primary product sources: https://github.com/newren/git-filter-repo https://github.com/newren/git-filter-repo/blob/main/Documentation/git-filter-repo.txt https://rtyley.github.io/bfg-repo-cleaner/ https://github.com/rtyley/bfg-repo-cleaner